St. John's Law Review
Volume 27
Number 2 Volume 27, May 1953, Number 2

Article 21

Resale Price Maintenance and the McGuire Act
St. John's Law Review

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview
This Recent Development in New York Law is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's
Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of
St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu.

LEGISLATION
RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE AND THE McGun=

ACT

Introduction
The McGuire Act,1 recently enacted into law, was designed to
clear the fog surrounding resale price maintenance 2 in America.
This latter refers to a contract, or system of contracts, whereby the
producer or distributor of a trade-marked article attempts to fix the
ultimate price to the consumer. Fair trade, or resale price maintenance, is believed to be economically desirable since its benefits, such
as an assured margin of profits to the dealers, affect a large segment
of our business. Fair trade poses a legal problem because of the
existence of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act,3 which prohibits contracts
in restraint of interstate commerce. A twofold problem is presented,
economic and legal, and each will be separately discussed herein.
Economic Analysis of Fair Trade
The Argument for Fair Trade
Competitive pricing breeds competitive abuses, which have widespread effects within the distributive process. The principal evil
under attack is "loss leader" 4 selling, viz., pricing branded goods at
cost or less to lure customers into the store. This type of pricecutting, a practice of the larger stores, allegedly causes economic loss
in the form of reduced profits for those retailers who lose sales
thereby. By precipitating downward spirals of price levels, unre632, 15 U. S. C. A. § 45 (Supp. 1952).
2 "Resale price maintenance may be defined as that system of distributing
trade-marked articles by which the trade-mark owner fixes the prices at which
his trade-marked goods are to be sold by wholesalers and retailers irrespective of their individual contractual relations with the trade-mark owner."
1 CALLMiANN, LAW OF UNFAIR COMPSTITION AND TRADE-MARKS 439 (2d ed.
1950).
326 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U. S. C. § 1 (1946).
4" 'Loss leader' is the term applied to the practice of selling nationally
known articles at cost or less than cost for the calculated purpose of enticing
customers away from competitors and into stores where they may be entrapped
into purchasing other goods at marked-up prices that will more than make up
for the loss on the 'leader.'" Louisiana Wholesale Distributors Ass'n v.
Rosenzweig, 214 La. 1, 36 So. 2d 403, 404 (1948). For a fuller exposition,
see OPPENHEIM, UNFAIR TRADE PRACTiCES 892, 893 (1950).
166 STAT.
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stricted competition leads to a more tragic result-the widespread
failure of small independent retailers 1 whose, survival is a vital economic factor in the welfare of the community. The manufacturer
likewise needs the protective floor of the fair trade price to protect
the good will of his product from dilution in the consumer's mind.
When the price of trade-marked goods is cut, their reputation for
quality is bound to suffer. 6
A more tangible evil is disclosed by the argument that the manufacturer needs fair trade to keep his product from being driven off
the market by retailers who refuse to sell it as a defense to "pricejugglers." 7 These unscrupulous retailers reduce prices of branded
articles, thereby forcing competitors to take the price-cut commodity
off their shelves rather than lose their margin of profit in the maelstrom of sacrifice selling.
The consumer, it is argued, is harmed by "loss leader" selling,
because the cost of this type of "advertising" reflects itself in a higher
general price level.8 Since he rarely leaves the store without purchasing an article on which the price has been increased to balance
the loss on the "leader," the consumer realizes no benefit by these
practices.
Fair trade is advanced as an anti-monopoly measure. The hope
of the fair trader is to eliminate all "price-juggling" on branded
goods, and thus equalize the competitive strength of the independent
retailer with that of the giant chain stores 1 thereby safeguarding the
continuance of a healthy small business community.
Probably the argument most relied on by the advocates of price
maintenance, though often unexpressed or disguised, is that the livelihoods of some ten million retailers, wholesalers and their employees
are affected by what happens to fair trade.10 Their economic wellbeing should be as much a consideration of the legislature as that of
the farmer and the laborer. Fair trade is nevertheless urged as a
measure consistent with our competitive system, 1 since it places control of prices in the hands of those who regulate the distributive
process, acting under contracts designed to protect the manufacturer's
5 Report of the Select Committee on Small Business, H. R. RP. No. 1292,
82d Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1952) (hereinafter referred to as Select Committee
Report).

6Report of the Committee on the Judiciary, H. R. REP. No. 1516, 82d
Cong., 2d Sess. 8, 9 (1952) (hereinafter referred to as Judiciary Committee
Report).
7

Select Committee Report, siepra note 5, at 7.

8Hearings before the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on

H. R. 5767, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1952) (hereinafter referred to as Interstate
Commerce Committee Hearings).
9Interstate Commerce Committee Hearings, supra note 8, at 62, 74.

10 Ibid.

11 Select Committee Report, supra note 5, at 44, 45 (Reconciliation of Fair

Trade and Principles of Free Competition).
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brand, good will, the retailer's competitive position, and the consumer's standards of quality.
Arguments Against Fair Trade
Those who oppose resale price maintenance maintain that the
traditional American system of price regulation by the operation of
the economic laws of supply and demand is sufficient, though they
concede that a perfectly free competitive pricing system, unfettered
by policing regulations, breeds abuses. They maintain, however, that
the present price structure is not entirely governed by the forces of
free competition, and that present regulatory measures are sufficient
to prevent the abuses of free competition. As examples, they cite
state "loss leader" statutes,' 2 prohibiting sales below cost, and the
Robinson-Patman Act, prohibiting discriminatory pricing.' 3 Fair
trade legislation, unlike these policing measures, is not designed to
protect the public from the evils of unrestrained price-cutting, but to
eliminate all forms of price competition, legitimate or reprehensible,
by providing a contractually maintained price floor below which no
retailer may lawfully sell. Price reductions made possible by lowcost store management, inventory control, or low-rent store location
-all are condemned on fair-traded items. 14 Efficient sellers are denied the opportunity afforded them under a relatively freer pricing
system to increase their volume by price reductions based on economies.'3 Thus, price minimums are said to lead to inefficiency and
the stifling of initiative. The cushioned margin of profit of a fair
trade price will invariably be geared to keep all distributors in the
field, including the most inefficient, since the contracting manufacturer is subject not only to the desire to achieve the greatest spread
the insistent pressures of retail groups to proof distribution, 16 but to
17
vide a higher margin.
2

A table of the various state statutes prohibiting sales below cost is found
in OPPENHEIM, UNFAIR TRADE PRAcTIcEs 951, 952 (1950). The primary obstacle to proper enforcement of these statutes is the difficulty of determining
a workable definition of "cost." See also Select Committee Report, supra note
1

5, at 11.

1aHearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Interstate and

Foreign Commerce on H. R. 5767, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 314, 323 (1952) (here-

inafter referred to as Interstate Commerce Subcommittee Hearings) (statement of Dr. James M. Blair, Assistant Director and Chief, Division of Eco-

nomics, Federal Trade Commission).

14 See REPORT OF THE CoMMiTTEr

To STUDY COMBINES LEGISLATION AND

INTEGRM REPORT ON RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE

69 (Canada 1952); Inter-

state Commerce Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 13, at 314, 318.
15 Ibid.
61Interstate Commerce Subcommittee Hearings,supra note 13, at 314, 318.
17 "The Department of Justice has brought criminal cases against several
trade associations for activities going beyond those contemplated by the MillerTydings Act. Indictments were returned against the National Association of
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The extent of the economic havoc wrought by "loss leader" practices and unfettered competition in pricing is minimized by those who
oppose fair trade. Concrete evidence of business failures directly
caused by these competitive abuses is said to be lacking.18 The extent of "loss leader" practice itself is questioned, since often what appears to be price-cutting by mass distributors is legitimate price reduction based on economies of operation. 19
"Fair trade prices tend to be high prices" 20 represents another
indictment of the price-maintained system. The manufacturer, when
induced by the demands of organized distributors for a higher margin, will naturally pass the burden on to the consumer in the form
of a higher price. Since under fair trade, pricing is not the result of
competition, but of the interplay of horizontal and vertical forces
arising from contractual agreements, and retailer group pressure on
the manufacturer, prices will tend to be cast in a rigid mold. Since
the price-making forces bear no relation to production and marketing
costs, prices will be 2 relatively inflexible and will not react properly
to economic change.

1

Fair trade, as a corrective of competitive abuses, is held to be
unenforceable. Discount houses flout the laws by "speakeasy" sales
to card-introduced customers. 22 A permanent policing system, costly
to manufacturer and consumer alike, is necessary to prevent this practice.

Chain stores, and supermarkets, the ".

.

. mastodons of retail

merchandising . . . in the jungle of the marketplace .... 1,23 will
inevitably find new ways to combat measures designed to equalize
the relative competitive strengths of the independent. Fair trade
Retail Druggists, the National Wholesale Druggists Association, the New York
State Pharmaceutical Association, and the Colorado Wholesale Wine and Liquor
Dealers Association ...
"In all these cases, the defendants were charged with a conspiracy to raise,
fix, and maintain prices and with persuading producers to enter into agreements
to fix prices at a level to give retailers a desired margin of profit. Methods
of persuasion included boycotting noncooperating producers. In each case nolo
contendere pleas were entered and fines were assessed against the defendants."
Hearings before the Antitrust Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary on Resale Price Maintenance, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 18, 29 (1952) (hereinafter referred to as Antitrust Subcommittee Hearings) (statement of H. G.
Morison, Assistant Attorney General of the United States). See also Interstate Commerce Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 13, at 367 (statement
of Q. Forrest Walker, Economist, R. H. Macy and Co.).
sInterstate Commerce Sutbcommittee Hearings, supra note 13, at 361, 365
(statement of Q. Forrest Walker, Economist, R. H. Macy and Co.).
19 FEDERAL TRADE

COMMISSION,

REPORT ON

RESALE

PRICE MAINTENANCE

259 20(1945).
Select Committee Report, supra note 5, at 51.
21 Id.at 53.
22 See Note, 64 HARV. L. REv. 1327, 1333 (1951).
23
Interstate Commerce Committee Hearings, supra note 8, at 74 (statement
of Maurice Mermey, Director, Bureau of Education of Fair Trade, New
York).
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enables the giant to obtain contract-guaranteed margins on branded
items, 2while
attracting customers with its own price-cut "house brand"
4
goods.
Evaluation
The factual basis for both disputants' contentions will not be
completely examined. Instead it is proposed to obtain a general picture of their validity by a brief glimpse at the effects of fair trade
legislation, so far as they can be ascertained, on: (1) those in the
productive and distributive processes, (2) the prices of consumer
goods.
Ramifications in the Productive and Distributive Processes
It is recognized that indiscriminate price-cutting and "loss leader"
selling was prevalent in the early thirties when fair trade was introduced. During the same period the number of retail business failures was at an all-time high. Fair traders have read these facts together and sought to capitalize on the result.25 This emphasis on
price-cutting, as a cause of business failures, would appear to be
misplaced for a number of reasons.
There has always been a dearth of information on .the actual
retailer consequences of "loss leader" selling.2 6 It has been recognized by the Federal Trade Commission as a problem more surrounded by emotionalism than by factual information. 27 Price-cutting
as a cause of retailer failures is undoubtedly matched or exceeded by
other factors.2 s The mass distributor often bests the independent in
obtaining expert management and adequate capital to function and
expand. Difficult to measure, these factors nevertheless play an important part in the struggle for retailer existence. Large scale buying and selling, enabling the mass distributor to undersell the independent and still make a profit, 2often
manifests itself in practices
9
loosely called "loss leader" selling.
The relationship of price-cutting to the inroads of the chains
into retailing during the early thirties is another premise easy of
statement but difficult of proof. Chain monopoly, resulting in failures of independents, was often obtained through the employment of
various discriminatory practices.30 Special discounts to chain pur24 Judiciary Committee Report, supra note 6, at 27.
25 Interstate Commerce Committee Hearings, supra note 8, at 56.
26
FEDERAL TRADE

Com

issIoN, REPORT oN

RESALE

PRICE MAINTENANCE

258 (1945).
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid.
29

Ibid.

30 Interstate Commerce Committee Hearings, supra note 8, at 35 (testimony
of Dr. James M. Blair, Assistant Director and Chief, Division of Economics,
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chasers, advertising allowances, and geographical price discrimination
all contributed to the growth of the chain, but these practices were
at least inhibited, if not obviated, by other legislation.8 1 It would be
economically unrealistic, in the face of the variables contributing to
retailer failures, to force a correlation between "loss leader" practices
and the number of business failures. The economic chaos of the era
would color any statistical evidence of price-cutting's relation to business failures, if such evidence were available.
In any event, fair trade may not be of long run aid to the independent in his fight to prevent underselling by the chain. There is
evidence that the chain has in certain instances benefited from resale
price maintenance by obtaining the fair trade margin on nationally
branded products, while pushing its private lines at prices which the
independent cannot meet.82 High profit margins on fair-traded drug
items are so inviting that the chain has taken to stocking them. 88
Thus, the independent druggist has seen the grocery chain benefit by
a law advocated partly to equalize the competitive strength of the
independent.
Protection of the manufacturer's good will in the brand name
and product was recognized by the Supreme Court in the Old
Dearborn34 case, as the basis for resale price maintenance legislation.
The reasoning, that the buying public would associate cut prices with
low quality, and that the manufacturer's good will would be impaired
by this consumer opinion of his wares, has been attacked by legal
writers.85
They argue that the public is not that easily duped. Their position is strengthened by the finding of the Federal Trade Commission 36
Federal Trade Commission). An extensive list of the abuses leading to the
enactment of the Robinson-Patman Act, and the primary effects of that law
as intended by its sponsors, is found in OPPENHEIM, UNFAIR TRADE PRACTIcEs
1020-23 (1950).
31 See, e.g., 49 STAT. 1526 (1936), 15 U. S. C. § 13 (1946)
(RobinsonPatman Act).
32 See note 24 supra. This is recognized by the proponents of fair trade.
Interstate Commerce Committee Hearings, supra note 8, at 69.
3 ". . . [S]tudies reveal that 85% of the large grocery outlets now dispense
dentifrices, certain pharmaceuticals, and health and beauty aids formerly sold
primarily in drug stores.

The magnitude of profits guaranteed . . . [has]

converted some of the large supermarkets into ardent advocates of fair trade."

Judiciary Committee Report, sapra note 6, at 19 (minority views).
Legis., 36 CORNELL L. Q. 781, 795 (1951).

See also

34 Old Dearborn Distributing Co. v. Seagram-Distillers Corp., 299 U. S.

183 (1936).

35 See Legis., 36 CORNELL L. Q. 781, 791 (1951); Note, 64 HARV. L. REV.
1327 (1951). "The fear of loss of consumer confidence in low-priced goods

is based largely upon an assumption of consumer irrationality."
see

GRETHER,

(1939).
36

Id. at 1329;

PucE CONTROL UNDER FAIR TRADE LEisLATIoN 268, 384

"The Commission has been at some pains to discover instances of such

price cutting which were sufficiently severe to result in a permanent and ma-

1953]

LEGISLATION

that producer volume is not in fact materially decreased by "loss
leader" practices, and by the fact that few manufacturers appear on
behalf of fair trade legislation."7 Often it requires coercion by a retailer group, bent on obtaining for its members an assured profit,
to influence a manufacturer to enter a contract which the Supreme
Court deemed a necessary method of manufacturer protection. Pepsodent Company soon found its product being concealed under druggists'
shelves when it temporarily abdicated the fair trade fold.3s It is not
surprising that a leading authority 3 9 considered the judiciary's position unrealistic.
Does leader selling drive branded goods off distributor's shelves
to the producer's detriment? A dealer, caught in a spiral of downward prices caused by indiscriminate price-cutting may adopt this
method of self-preservation. But he has other alternatives. He may
risk volume decline temporarily by not meeting the competitor's price.
He may approach those warring nearest him and bid for measures of
truce. 40 The early subsidence, and restricted geographical consequences 41 of price wars indicate that dealers soon reach tacit understandings to level and even reverse the downward trend. The Federal Trade Commission, in 1931, a year of widespread business failures, failed to uncover one instance where a manufacturer's
42 article
of merit was driven off the market by price-cutting alone.
Influence on the Price of Consumer Goods
It is recognized that resale price maintenance engenders "understandings" among distributors, often verging on the horizontality 43
terial reduction of the manufacturer's volume of business, but without discovering any instances in which it could be satisfactorily shown that decreased
volume was primarily due to dealer price cutting." FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, REPORT ON RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE II, 4 (1931).
3 Select Committee Report, supra note 5, at 23.
3s Judiciary Committee Report, mpra note 6, at 20 (minority views).
31 See GRETHER, PRICE CONTROL UNDER FAIR TRADE LEGISLATION 268, 384

(1939).

40 The dealer would, of course, be risking a prosecution under the antitrust laws.

41 PREVALENCE OF PRICE CUTTING OF MERCHANDISE MARKETED UNDER PRICE
MAINTENANCE AGREEMENTS, committee print, 82d Cong., Ist Sess. v (1951),

cited in Judiciary Committee Report, supra note 6, at 47.
42 "No instance . . . has yet been brought to the commission's attention in
which there was conclusive evidence that an article of real merit has been
driven off the market by price cutting alone." FEDEAL TRADE COMMISSION,
11, 162 (1931).
43 "Vertical price fixing is accomplished through agreements between manu-

REPORT ON RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE

facturers and wholesalers, wholesalers and retailers, or manufacturers and retailers. Horizontal price fixing, by contrast, is achieved through agreements
among manufacturers, among wholesalers, or among retailers." Antitrust Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 17, at 273 n. 4 (comment by Walter Adams,
Economic Consultant, U. S. Senate, 82d Cong., 1st Sess.). Within this defi-

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[ VOL. 27

condemned by the anti-trust laws, to put pressure on manufacturers
to grant more generous margins. 44 The drug trade has aimed at a
50% markup,4 5 which has been realized in a number of instances. 46
A leading producer of pharmaceuticals featured this attraction in its
advertisement to distributors. 47 Increasing the spread of dealer margins can only be accomplished by one of two methods: lowering the
cost to the distributor, or raising the fair trade list price at which
the commodity is sold to consumers. The almost compelling inference is that in most cases the producer will risk volume decline by
raising the list price rather than cut into his own profit margin.
The hidden costs of fair trade have tended to increase distribution costs, and thus to affect commodity prices. 48 Fair trade committees and bureaus, financed out of the coffers of retailers, represent
one of the costlier items. The expenses of litigation, paid for by
those seeking to enforce price maintenance laws, and those charged
49
with violating them, all contribute to the enhancement of prices.
Statistical proof of price rises due to any given factor is, however,
difficult to obtain. The mentioned factors have some effect on prices;
the exact extent of that effect is almost impossible to ascertain. Surveys, offered in opposition to fair trade legislation, though taken in
isolated industries, show a number of instances of price increases. 50
A Federal Trade Commission survey reveals that prices of mass distributors rose, while those of the independent showed a slight decline.51 The greatest rise was in centers of population.52 A survey
nition, a concert of retailers to put pressure on manufacturers would be a
horizontal agreement, condemned by the antitrust laws.
44 Antitrust Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 17, at 29.

45 See 36 CORNELL L.

Q. 781, 792 (1951).

46 Judiciary Committee Report, supra note 6, at 41.

47 Ibid.
48FEDERAL TRADE CommIsSIoN, REPORT ON RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE

LXI (1945).

49 Ibid.
50 A graphic illustration of the spread between fair trade drug prices and
non-fair-trade drug prices is found in Judiciary Committee Report, supra note
6, at 42 (minority views). The table, comparing prices of important drug-

store products sold in forty-five fair trade states, with the prices in non-fairtrade District of Columbia, shows higher prices on all of over sixty fair trade
items compared. Another survey disclosed that prices for thirty-five different fifths of nationally advertised liquors cost only $139.67 in St. Louis
(non-fair-trade area), while consumers paid $2225 more, or $161.92 in Illinois

(fair trade area), a difference of 15.9 per cent.

Id. at 41.

Antitrust Sub-

committee Hearings, supra note 17, at 836-42.

51 FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, REPORT ON RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE
575-846 (1945). See OXENFELDT, INDUSTRIAL PRICING AND MARYETING PRACTICES (1951).
The author interprets the Federal Trade Commission's statistics:

" .. [Resale price maintenance] forced chain stores to increase their prices,
while individual drug stores, on the average, showed price reductions which.
however, varied considerably with the size of stores, and, for all independent
store groups, the percentage decreases shown were much less than the per-
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made on behalf of fair trade proponents showed slightly higher average prices on drug items in non-fair-trade areas.53 One point emphasized by the fair trade advocates is that maintained prices tend to be
more stable in their resistance to inflation.5 4 In the final analysis,
both sides realize the difficulty of measuring the manifold influences
on price; neither maintains that its statistics are more than persuasive.
Among those who saw an increase was Grether,55 a leading authority, who made extensive studies in the drug and grocery industries
in California when the original fair trade act was passed in that state.
The Canadian Committee to Study Combines Legislation arrived at
the same conclusion.5 6
The vice inherent in almost all surveys on controversial subjects
is that each analyst has a different statistical axe to grind. Sampling
procedures, correlation, trend recognition, and the inferences which
are drawn from the study-all are tainted with the same virus-the
possibility of the preconceived result. A truly objective survey, made
by an institution having no particular proprietary interest in resale
price maintenance would do all concerned a service.
Despite the ring of universal economic altruism in many of the
arguments on behalf of fair trade, its most ardent advocates are organized retailers, 7 groups confessedly battling for their special incentage increases made by chain stores." Id. at 427. See Table, Interstate
Commerce Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 13, at 321.
52 OXENFELDT, INDUSTRIAL PRICING AND MARKETING PRACTICES,

supra note

51, at 427.
53 The I. A. C. Neilson & Co. Study, made on behalf of the Bureau of
Education on Fair Trade, showed the following: "Consumers in the fairtrade states paid less on the whole than consumers in the non-fair-trade area
for the 24 products [compared] taken as a group. The weighted composite
of all the prices for the entire period shows that consumers in the fair-trade
area paid 1.4 cents less than did consumers in the non-fair-trade area." Inter75.
state
54 Commerce Comnmittee Hearings, supra note 8, at
A study made by McKesson & Robbins purported to show that prices in
drug items (largely fair-traded) had risen only slightly betveen January 1,
1947, and December 1, 1950, compared with the rise in the cost of living reflected by the prices of other articles. Interstate Commerce Committee Hearings, supra note 8, at 77, 78. It might well be argued, consistently with a
finding that fair trade prices did not respond quickly to inflationary pressures,
that fair trade prices were higher than average at the beginning of the study,
and that inflationary pressures only served to reduce slightly the dealer margins, not compelling a rise in prices. The minority of the House Committee
on the judiciary noted the following objections to the McKesson & Robbins
survey: (1) It compared wholesale price levels in fair-traded drug products
with the general retail price index reflecting the over-all cost of living. (2) The
starting point for the survey was January 1947 when the wholesale drug index
had reached its highest point in 20 years. Judiciary Committee Report, supra
note 6, at 39.
55 Grether, Experience in California with Fair Trade Legislation Restricting
Price Cutting, 24 CALIF. L. REv. 640, 662 (1936).
56 REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE TO STUDY COMBINES LEGISLATION AND INTERImB

REPORT ON RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE 69 (Canada 1952).
.57In the foreground is the National Association of Retail Druggists.

Lesser
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terests. Resale price maintenance is opposed by large scale distributors, 58 who fear a threat to their "low price" marketing methods.
But in the fore of the opponents, one finds also consumer groups,59
labor groups, 0 farm groups 61 and various government agencies 62
who have studied the problem. It is evident that fair trade is, in
purpose if not in consequence, social legislation; a law functioning
to insure profitable operation to a designated group within the economy. It is submitted that herein lies fair trade's strongest argument.
When the economic policy evinced by Congress is the guaranteeing
of fair opportunity to specified groups, then economics becomes in
effect a weighing of the equities. In such a situation the voice of the
small independent retailer is entitled to as much consideration as
that of any other group. But the issue simmers down to this: Is
this the type of social legislation needed today? The answer to this
can only be determined by a complete study of the problem; and this
entails an analysis of the legal aspects of fair trade as well as economic considerations.
Legislative Analysis of Fair Trade
History

At common law, restraints upon trade were not illegal unless
they failed to meet certain conditions as to scope and necessity.es In
1890, these rules became statutory with the passage of the Sherman
Act, which provided that "[e] very contract, combination in the form
of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce
among the several states .... ,,64 was prohibited.6 5
lights include associations representing jewelers, stationers, meat dealers, liquor
distributors, automobile dealers, book sellers, tire dealers, hardware dealers,
tobacconists, and grocers. Select Committee Report, supra note 5, at 22, 23.
Select Committee Re58 R. H. Macy and Co. is one of the better known.
port, supra note 5, at 23.
59 Among them, Consumers Research Inc., National Housewives League,
Federation of Citizens Associations, American Home Economic Association.
Select Committee Report, supra note 5, at 23.
60 The American Federation of Labor, the Congress of Industrial Organizations. Select Committee Report, supra note 5, at 23.
61 The American Farm Bureau Federation, National Grange, National Dairy
Union. Select Committee Report, supra note 5, at 24.
62 The Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice, the Federal Trade
Commission, the Department of Agriculture. Select Committee Report, supra
note 5, at 24. The Department of Commerce is in favor of fair trade. Interstate Commerce Committee Hearings, supra note 8, at 79-81.
63 Cf. Mitchel v. Reynolds, 1 P. Wins. 181, 24 Eng. Rep. 347 (K. B. 1711);
Diamond Match Co. v. Roeber, 106 N. Y. 473, 13 N. E. 419 (1887).
64 26 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U. S. C. § 1 (1946) ; cf. Kiefer-Stewart Co. v.
Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U. S.211 (1951).
65 Cf. Sola Electric Co. v. Jefferson Electric Co., 317 U. S. 173 (1942);
Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States, 309 U. S.436 (1940) ; Dr. Miles Medi-
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Many people, especially the small retailers, felt that the Sherman
Act should not have banned agreements maintaining a minimum price
on trade-marked products.66 The Act, however, did not prevent
stores from engaging in such practices as "loss leader" selling.
Necessarily, these sales-methods were limited to large department
stores, because small shop-owners with limited resources could not
compete in this manner. Consequently, dealer organizations agitated for a change in the law.67
The first state fair trade law was the California act, which, in
1931, permitted the execution and enforcement of resale price maintenance contracts. 68 Two years later, this statute was modified so as
to extend the binding force, including injunctive relief, of price maintenance contracts to include non-signers-those who were not parties
to the agreements. 69 Several other states passed similar laws; and
in 1936 the Supreme Court held such statutes valid, even as to the
non-signers.7 0 Most of the remaining states then passed fair trade
laws.
In 1937 the Miller-Tydings Act

71

was passed by Congress.

By

its terms, resale price maintenance contracts were exempted from the
ambit of the Sherman Act 72 though horizontal combinations remained

illegal. Thus, though agreements between manufacturers, or between
wholesalers, or other competing groups were void as horizontal arrangements, contracts between manufacturer and wholesaler or between wholesaler and retailer-vertical agreements-were now permissible. The Miller-Tydings Act further qualified the type of
contracts that would be allowed as those "prescribing minimum
prices" for the resale of a trade-marked commodity, when such contracts are permissible as to intrastate transactions within the state in
which the resale is to be made.
When the federal courts applied the Miller-Tydings Act in specific cases, it became apparent that this law did not meet with wholecal Co. v. Park & Sons, 220 U. S. 373 (1911) ; see United States v. Socony-

Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U. S. 150, 218 (1940).
66 See Select Committee Report, supra note 5, at 18.
67 See Note, 6 SOUTHvFzsmN L. J. 117, 118 (1952).
6s CAL. GEN. LAWS Act 8782, § 1 (Deering, 1937).
66 CAL. GEN. LAws Act 8782, § 13/2 (Deering, 1937).
70 Old Dearborn Distributing Co. v. Seagram-Distillers Corp., 299 U. S.
183 (1936) (Illinois statute); The Pep Boys v. Pyroil Sales Co., 299 U. S.
198 (1936) (California statute).
7150 STAT. 693 (1937), 15 U. S. C. § 1 (1946).
72
See Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U. S. 384, 389
(1951). "The most feasible interpretation that the courts can attach to the
Miller-Tydings Amendment... is that it removes the penalties of the Sherman
Act from parties making contracts ... to fix and control resale prices under
certain stated conditions and nothing more." Comment, 3 ALA. L. Rv. 352,
367 (1951).
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hearted judicial approval. 73 In fact, the statute was restricted to its
literal provisions. 74 As a result, this act soon lost most of its efficacy,
and it became evident that a new law was necessary if resale price
maintenance was to continue effectively in this country.
The Non-Signer Clause
Trade-marks are entitled to protection inasmuch as their primary function is ...
to prevent confusion of the public regarding
the origin of goods of competing vendors." 75 It has been asserted

that they are likewise entitled to protection because they represent an
interest-i.e., the good will attached to the label-which is retained
by the manufacturer or wholesaler when he sells his trade-marked
product. 76 Resale price maintenance has been advanced as a means
of affording this protection. The non-signer who sells at below the
price established by these fair trade agreements is said to exploit unfairly the trade-mark owner's good will,77and to take undue advantage
of dealers who abide by their contracts.
This view is disputed with the argument that:
[O]nce the product is sold, with the ... trademark... on the commodity,
then the purchaser becomes the owner of the commodity with the trademark
. . . attached and a part of it, and the producer . . . no longer retains what
he has sold, and the purchaser is entitled to what he has bought, to be dealt
with by him .. . subject only to the proper exercise of the State and Federal
S..

police power.

... 78

In reply, advocates of fair trade assert that the non-signer clause
is lawful, since the non-signer may be said to have impliedly agreed
to be bound by the terms of the price maintenance agreements. 79
Their argument runs thus: the non-signer was under no duty or compulsion to buy from the trade-mark owner; 80 however, since he did

73 See Comments, 3 ALA. L. REv. 352, 36-68 (1951), 20 U. OF KAN. CIrY
L. REv. 80, 83 (1952).
74 See Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., supra note 72; Sunbeam Corp. v. Wentling, 185 F. 2d 903 (3d Cir. 1950), judgment vacated, 341
U. S. 944 (1951).
75 Shakespeare Co. v. Lippman's Tool Shop Sporting Goods Co., 334 Mich.
109, 54 N. W. 2d 268, 270 (1952).
76 See Old Dearborn Distributing Co. v. Seagram-Distillers Corp., 299
U. S. 183, 194 (1936) ; see Note, 125 A. L. R. 1335, 1345 (1940) ; see note 80
infra. But see 1 CALLMANx, LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADE-MARKS
449 (2d ed. 1950).
7TSee Sears v. Western Thrift Stores, Inc., 10 Wash. 2d 372, 116 P. 2d
756, 762 (1941).
78Liquor Store, Inc. v. Continental Distilling Corp., 40 So. 2d 371, 381
(Fla. 1949) (concurring opinion) (emphasis omitted).
79 See Old Dearborn Distributing Co. v. Seagram-Distillers Corp., supra
note 76, at 193; Sears v. Western Thrift Stores, Inc., supra note 77, 116 P.
2d at 762-63.
80 See Note, 125 A. L. R. 1335, 1346 (1940).
"This reasoning, of course,
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buy, and since he knew of the price restrictions at the time he bought,8 '2
he may be said to have tacitly agreed to abide by these limitations.
Needless to say, this argument loses its force in cases where the nonsigner was in fact ignorant of any price restrictions.8 3
In a recent decision, the Supreme Court held that the non-signer
provisions of price maintenance laws were invalid under the Sherman
Act.8 4 The Miller-Tydings Act was limited to its terms, and since
it did not mention non-signers, the Court refused to extend the force
of the fair trade agreements to other than the contracting parties.1s
Indicative of its sentiments, the Court went on to state that:
When they [i.e., the advocates of fair trade] seek . . .to impose price fixing
on persons who have not contracted or agreed to the scheme . . . [tihat is
not price fixing by contract ... that is price fixing by compulsion. ...
. . . [W]hen retailers are [thus] forced to abandon price competition, they
are driven into a compact in violation of the spirit of the proviso which forbids
"horizontal" price fixing.8

Though it did not so state on this occasion, it may well be that the
Supreme Court will refuse to uphold the non-signer clause if this
question of illegality arises in a future case. The mere statement in
the McGuire Act that non-signers are bound 87 does not appear sufficient to do more than pose the exact question: Has Congress power

to bind a non-signer to an agreement made by other private persons,
without benefit of public hearing to determine the reasonableness of
the terms as to resale price? 88
The Sherman Act forbade, and the Miller-Tydings Act continued

the prohibition against, agreements between competitors regulating
can be answered by the argument that one cannot long run a business preserving the liberty of refusing to buy products hamstrung by resale price maintenance contracts. He would soon find all his sources of supply gone, and himself out of business." Fink, Fair Trade and Resale Price Maintenance in
Florida, 5 MIAmi L. Q. 553, 561 (1951).
81 "The manufacturer may 'stipulate' the price by mere notice or other
purely unilateral statements." 1 CALUMANN, op. cit. supra note 76, at 466.
82 See note 79 supra; Note, 125 A. L. R. 1335, 1346 (1940).
83 Mere knowledge of the existence of such a contract will not suffice to
bind the non-signer; but if a notice of minimum resale prices accompanies the
goods, then a contract might be implied. See Note, 19 A. L. R. 2d 1139,
1145 (1951).
84 Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U. S.384 (1951).
85 Id.at 388.
88 Id. at 388-89; see Fink, supra note 80, at 562.
87 Once a contract is made, valid under state law, its force may be exerted
over others ". . . whether the person . . . is or is not a party to such a contract or agreement. . . !' 66 STAT. 632, 15 U. S. C. A. § 45 (Supp. 1952).
88 With the enactment of the McGuire Act, ". . . a private contract, the

provisions of which would be determined without public hearing and apart
from any public supervision as to reasonableness, would be made binding upon
all dealers and the consuming public." Letter from Fed. Trade Comm'n, 16
(Feb. 2, 1952), H. R. RE. No. 1437, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1952).
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the resale price of their goods.8 9 If a manufacturer agrees with a
wholesaler on the resale price of an article bearing the manufacturer's
trademark, the Miller-Tydings Act validates the arrangement. This
contract may be brought about by the instigation of either the manufacturer or the wholesaler.9 0 Similarly, contracts may be executed
between wholesalers and retailers. Except for the decision mentioned
above, it would seem that where retailers induce their wholesalers to
sign resale price maintenance contracts, the arrangement closely approximates a horizontal agreement. 91 Under the McGuire Act, which
validates the non-signer clause, the resemblance to the forbidden horizontal arrangement becomes even greater; for the retailer, perhaps
one of a number who feel that a stated price should be the sum for
which a branded article should be sold, may by his action determine
a price which will be binding upon all other retailers.9 2 The one retailer can thus effectuate the same result by his unilateral action that
93
he could not achieve by direct agreements with his fellow-retailers.
Similarly, a single retailer could arbitrarily impose his price upon all
other retailers within the effective bounds of the price maintenance
contract. It would seem, therefore, that either much or all of the
sting has been drawn from the prohibition against horizontal
9 4 agreements-at least insofar as these affect trade-marked goods.
Effect on Interstate Commerce
The Sherman Act prohibited any form of agreement which imposed burdens upon interstate commerce. The Miller-Tydings Act
supposedly amended the Sherman Act to the extent of validating
what would otherwise be illegally restrictive agreements governing
the price of branded goods. 95 In a recent case involving a Pennsylvania fair trade statute, the court held that, since the Miller-Tydings
Act did not expressly state that price maintenance contracts might
apply to interstate commerce, these agreements were valid only as to
intrastate business.9 6 This is further indication of apparent judicial
of fair trade by limitation of the statute to its exact
disapproval
97
terms.
89 See H. R. R P. No. 1437, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1952).
90 See Legis., 36 CORNELL L. Q. 781, 793 (1951) ; Fink, .mpra note 80, at

559.

9' See Comment, 61 YAZ L. J. 381, 401 (1952).
92 Ibid.; Fink, supra note 80, at 562.
93 Cf. United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U. S. 265, 279 (1942); see
Note, 125 A. L. R. 1335, 1337 (1940); Legis., 36 CORNE.L L. Q. 781, 793

(1951).

94 See Letter from Fed. Trade Comm'n,
No. 1437, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1952).
95 See 81 CONG. Rzc. 7495-7 (1937).

9 (Feb. 2, 1952), H. R. REP.

9 Sunbeam Corp. v. Wentling, 185 F. 2d 903 (3d Cir. 1950), judgment
vacated, 341 U. S. 944 (1951).
97 See Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U. S. 384, 396
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The new McGuire Act reverses the effect of the last-mentioned
decision, and states that no contract allowed by the state fair trade
laws "... shall constitute an unlawful burden or restraint upon, or interference with commerce." 98 The Committee Report accompanying
the, House version of the Act states that:
[Tihe purpose of this provision is to remove any obstacle, as far as the Federal
law is concerned, which might stand in the way of a broader interpretation of
State fair-trade laws so as to make them applicable to retail transactions and
retail advertising which cross State lines. 90
The effect of this provision in the new law is not clear. 100 The
applicability of the Federal statute depends upon whether or not the
subject matter of the contractual restrictions is in interstate commerce. 10 1 This was a problem before the McGuire Act, and it remains one today. Decisional law is not settled as to whether goods
made, distributed and sold within a state may nevertheless be so enmeshed in interstate commerce ' 0 2 that price restrictions on them will
03
exert an influence upon the price of goods sold outside the state.
The case limiting the Pennsylvania statute never decided the question
of what the effect of a contract made in that state would be in a sister
state. 10 4 The McGuire Act, as did its predecessor, states that the
legality of a contract in a given case is determined by the law of the
state in which the resale is made. 10 5 At first blush this might appear
a simple solution; but a second glance at the various state fair trade
laws will dispel that illusion. 08 Some states, for example, permit
contracts which restrain sales at below a stated minimum price, 0 7
while in other states the contracts allowed are those which refer to
stipulated prices.' 08 What is the difference? In a not-too-ancient
(1951)

(concurring opinion) ; see 1

Fink, supra note 80, at 557.

CALLMANN,

op. cit. supra note 76, at 508;

98 66 STAT. 632, 15 U. S. C. A. § 45 (Supp. 1952).

99 1. R. REP. No. 1437, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1952).
100 "To remove the prohibitions of the Sherman Act is one thing, but to

remove the question of unlawful restraint of interstate commerce is another."
Comment, 3 ALA. L. REV. 352, 361 (1951).
101 See Bulova Watch Co. v. S. Klein, Inc., 199 Misc. 818, 105 N. Y. S. 2d
175 (Sup. Ct. 1951) ; Comment, 61 YALE L. J. 381, 398 (1952).

102 "Because the anti-trust laws aim to establish a nationwide uniform rule of
economic conduct, economic effects upon interstate commerce must guide de-

cisions." Comment, 61 YAL.E L. J. 381, 398 (1952).
103 Cf. Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334

U. S. 219 (1948); United States v. Frankfort Distilleries, Inc., 324 U. S.
293 (1945); Bulova Watch Co. v. S. Klein, Inc., supra note 101. But cf.
Rothbaum v. R. H. Macy and Co., 199 Misc. 890, 105 N. Y. S. 2d 638 (Sup.

Ct. 1951).
L04See Sunbeam Corp. v. Wentling, 185 F. 2d 903, 908 (3d Cir. 1950),
judgment vacated, 341 U. S. 944, rehearing, 192 F. 2d 7 (3d Cir. 1951).
105 See H. R. REP. No. 1437, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1952).
108 See 1 CALLMANN, op. cit. supra note 76, at 444.
107 E.g., Alabama, Connecticut, Indiana, Michigan, Ohio.
108 E.g., California, Illinois, Massachusetts, New York.
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case decided in Louisiana,10 9 the court held that since the state law
referred to resale prices "stipulated by the vendor," the fair trade
contract was illegal, although its phraseology followed the language
of the Miller-Tydings Act and referred to minimum prices. On appeal, it is true, the lower court's decision was reversed on the ground
that the Louisiana statute, considered in its entirety, really meant
minimum, and not stipulated prices. 10 But the question might not
be settled too easily in another state where the statute specifically
refers to stipulated prices, and where the rest of the law is ineffective
to equate that term with "minimum." Apparently desirous of solving such a problem, the McGuire Act states that contracts may be
made "prescribing minimum or stipulated prices." Although the
contract may now be legal under the federal law, though it specify
either "stipulated" or "minimum" prices, care must still be taken due
to the continuing difference in the local state laws, which are made
the ultimate criteria for the legality of any given contract. It would
therefore seem that if the manufacturer desired to sell his trademarked product at one price all over the country, he would have to
execute two forms of price maintenance contracts, one prescribing
stipulated prices, and the other listing the minimum prices.
The McGuire Act has not succeeded in its attempt to clarify
fair trade laws in the United States. 1
The question of the validity
of the non-signer clause still exists, and awaits a final, clean-cut
determination by the Supreme Court..1 2 At present, non-signer
clauses are permissible in contracts regulating prices of trade-marked
goods in interstate commerce. Just what will be construed to be interstate commerce is another unsettled problem in resale price maintenance, apparently dependent for its solution upon the desire of the
particular court to either restrict or enlarge fair trade. A further
difficulty arising under the McGuire Act is how much force is
left in the old prohibition against horizontal combinations. The decisive problem yet unsolved is whether this new law can successfully
withstand constitutional attack.
i09Mennen Co. v. Krauss Co., 37 F. Supp. 161 (E.D. La. 1941).
110 Mennen Co. v. Krauss Co., 134 F. 2d 348 (5th Cir. 1943), reversing 37
F. Supp. 161 (E. D. La. 1941).
"'1 The McGuire Act ".

.

. is designed to restore the effectiveness of . . .

[the state fair trade] acts by making it abundantly clear that Congress means
to let State fair-trade laws apply in their totality. ...
"... [TJhis provision [regarding interstate commerce] is to remove any
obstacle, as far as Federal law is concerned, which might stand in the way of

a broader interpretation of State fair-trade laws ...." H. R. REP. No. 1437,

82d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1952).
112 See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Schwegmann Bros., 109 F. Supp. 269 (E. D. La.
1953). At this writing, appeal is pending before the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals.
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Constitutional Aspects
The constitutional questions raised by the federal fair trade legislation are primarily concerned with the due process clause of the
Fifth Amendment, and with legislative delegation of power to regulate interstate commerce. The due process issue may be resolved by
reference to parallel decisions of the Supreme Court with respect to
non-signer provisions in state statutes under the Fourteenth Amendment. The validity of these provisions was declared by the Court
in 1936, on the ground that the good will of a trade-mark is entitled
to reasonable protection.1 1 3 Some state courts, have nevertheless
found that state fair trade
laws violate state constitutional provisions
11 4
regarding due process.
Since, however, the McGuire Act permits non-signers to be
bound by the state laws, even where interstate transactions are concerned, a constitutional question has been raised-that the new statute effects an improper delegation of the powers granted to the Federal Government.
Congress has power under the Constitution to regulate interstate commerce.1 15 A problem soon arose as to whether the states
had totally divested themselves of their power to regulate goods passing over their borders, or whether the delegation to the Federal Government was only partial. One view, strongly supported by Chief
Justice Marshall, was that the power to regulate this trade was vested
completely and exclusively in Congress." 16 Opposed to this was the
opinion that, in the absence of federal regulation on the subject, the
states themselves could regulate interstate commerce.1 17 The gen-8
erally accepted rule was enunciated in Cooley v. Board of Wardens."1

11301d

Dearborn Distributing Co. v. Seagram-Distillers Corp., 299 U. S.

183 (1936).

114Liquor Store, Inc. v. Continental Distilling Co., 40 So. 2d 371 (Fla.
1949); Shakespeare Co. v. Lippman's Tool Shop Sporting Goods Co., 334
Mich. 109, 54 N. W. 2d 268 (1952).
115 U. S. CoNsT. Art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
"I" See Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1 (U. S. 1824). Chief Justice Marshall
later modified his position in Willson v. Blackbird Creek Marsh Co., 2 Pet.
245 (U. S. 1829) (state statute authorizing dam across navigable creek sustained). See FRANxFuRTER, THE COMMERCa
CLAUSE 20, 21 (1927).
117 See The License Cases, 5 How. 504, 579 (U. S. 1846) (per Taney, C.J.).
...
[T]he object and motive of the State are of no importance ....
It is
a question of power ....
[T]he grant of power to the federal government is
not an absolute and entire prohibition to the States, but merely confers upon
congress the superior and controlling power." Id. at 583.
11s 12 How. 299, 319 (U. S. 1851). "Now, the power to regulate commerce,
embraces a vast field, containing not only many, but exceedingly various subjects, quite unlike in their nature; some imperatively demanding a single uniform rule, operating equally on the commerce of the United States in every
port; and some . . . as imperatively demanding that diversity, which alone
can meet the local necessities....
"Whatever subjects of this power are in their nature national, or admit
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The Court there declared that there were two areas of regulation:
an exclusive area in which only Congress may legislate, and a concurrent area in which the states might exercise some control. Where
commerce is national in scope, or where uniformity of regulation is
required, the power to regulate is vested exclusively in Congress; 119
but where local policies and necessity make diversity of regulation
20
essential, the states may indirectly regulate interstate commerce,
subject, however, 12to federal regulation of that commerce by subsequent enactments.
The line of demarcation separating the "exclusive" area from
the "concurrent" area is, at best, tenuous; 122 and the courts have
been hesitant to define their exact limitations. To do so would be
virtually impossible, since the court must decide in each case
23 whether
the public interest will be best served by state regulation.
only of one uniform system, or plan of regulation, may justly be said to be
of such a nature as to require exclusive legislation by congress." See also
Gilman v. Philadelphia, 3 Wall. 713, 726, 727 (U. S. 1865).
129 Cf. Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U. S. 100 (1890); see Bowman v. Chicago &
N. W. Ry. 125 U. S. 465 (1888); Welton v. Missouri, 91 U. S. 275 (1875);
see The Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U. S. 352, 401 (1913). Compare i re
State Freight Tax, 15 Wall. 232 (U. S.1872) (state tax on freight entering,
leaving, or passing through states prohibited by commerce clause), and Morgan
v. Virginia, 328 U. S.373 (1946) (state regulation providing for segregation
of passengers on interstate motor carriers while in state violative of commerce
clause), zwith Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall. 35 (U. S. 1867) (state tax on persons leaving state not controlled by commerce clause). In this area, the
silence of Congress implies that such commerce is to be free from all regulation. Cf. Robbins v. Taxing Dist., 120 U. S.489 (1887); Walling v. Michigan, 116 U. S.446 (1886) ; see Sanitary Dist. v. United States, 266 U. S.405,
426 (1925).
120 See Cities Service Gas Co. v. Peerless Oil & Gas Co., 340 U. S. 179
(1950) (public utility regulation) ; Kelly v. Washington, 302 U. S. 1 (1937) ;
Reid v. Colorado, 187 U. S. 137 (1902) (quarantine); County of Mobile v.
Kimball, 102 U. S.691 (1880) (maintenance of harbors); Munn v. Illinois,
94 U. S. 113 (1876) (grain warehouse regulation); Gilman v. Philadelphia,
3 Wall. 713 (U. S. 1865) (bridge over navigable stream); Cooley v. Board
of Wardens, 12 How. 299 (U. S. 1851).
121 Cf. Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson, 315 U. S. 148 (1942); Oregon
Washington R. & N. Co. v. Washington, 270 U. S.87 (1926); see The Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U. S. 352, 399 (1913); Reid v. Colorado, 187 U. S.
137, 147 (1902). But cf. California v. Zook, 336 U. S. 725 (1949). State
laws, however, remain operative in that area which federal statutes do not
cover, unless there is a contrary congressional intent. See Panhandle Eastern
Pipe Line Co. v. Public Service Comm'r, 332 U. S. 507 (1947); Weber v.
Freed, 239 U. S. 325 (1915); see Bethlehem Steel Co. v. State Board, 330
U. S.767, 774 (1947).
122See Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U. S. 373, 377 (1946).
123 Compare South Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., 303
U. S. 177 (1938) (sustaining state regulation of size of interstate motor
vehicle carriers on roads within state), %pithSouthern Pacific Co. v. Arizona.
325 U. S. 761 (1945) (rejecting state regulation of length of trains engaged
in interstate commerce within state) ; Pennsylvania Gas Co. v. Public Service
Comm'n, 252 U. S.23 (1920) (state regulation of interstate sales of natural
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If the area of commerce regulated by the McGuire Act comes
within the concurrent jurisdiction of both the state and Federal Governments, there can be no question of the validity of the Act under
the commerce clause. Since the states have the inherent ability to
regulate such commerce indirectly, through the exercise of their police
power, they need not be delegated such power by Congress. 124 But
if the commerce affected by the McGuire Act falls into that area
where regulation is vested exclusively in Congress, then the Act would
appear to be invalid, 125 since the power to regulate, having been given
to Congress, cannot be restored to the states.' 26 If local laws were
permitted to operate in this "exclusive" area, the states' power to
alter or repeal such legislation, without any consultation with or deliberation by the Congress, would cause disunity where uniformity
27
and harmony are required.
Courts, however, have generally sustained enabling acts by finding that no delegation of power is involved. 28 In upholding these
acts, the courts declared that Congress was merely supplementing
the state law.' 29 Thus it was competent for Congress to divest goods
of their interstate character upon arrival in the state, 80 despite the
gas directly to consumers in interstate commerce upheld), and Panhandle
Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. Michigan Public Service Comm'n, 341 U. S. 329
(1951) (state regulation of sale in interstate commerce by producer to a consumer upheld), with Missouri v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 265 U. S. 298
(1924)
(state regulation of sales in interstate commerce to distributors invalid).
124 See Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 12 How. 299, 319 (U. S. 1851)
("... the mere grant of such a power to congress did not imply a prohibition on the States to exercise the same power.. .. ).
125 Cf. Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U. S. 149 (1920).
'12 See Cooley v. Board of Wardens, supra note 124, at 318; see WILLOUGHBY,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw OF THE UNITED STATES § 74 (2d ed. 1929).
127 See Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, supra note 125, at 164.
128 49

STAT. 494 (1935)

[Ashurst-Summers Act sustained in Kentucky Whip

& Collar Co. v. Illinois Cent. R. R., 299 U. S. 334 (1937)]; 45 STAT. J084
(1929), 49 U. S. C. § 60 (1946) [Hawes-Cooper Act sustained in Whitfield
v. Ohio, 297 U. S. 431 (1936)]; 39 STAT. 1069 (1919), 18 U. S. C. § 341
(1946) (repealed) [Reed Amendment sustained in United States v. Hill. 248
U. S.420 (1919)1; 37 STAT. 699 (1913), 27 U. S. C. § 122 (1946) [WebbKenyon Act sustained in Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Md. Ry., 242 U. S.
311 (1917)]; 26 STAT. 313 (1890), 27 U. S. C. § 121 (1946) [Wilson Act
sustained in It re Rabrer, 140 U. S.545 (1891)]; 41 STAT. 1073 (1920),
16 U. S. C. §813 (1946) [Federal Power Act §20 sustained in Safe -arbor
Water Power Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 124 F. 2d 800 (3d Cir. 1941)];
31 STAT. 187 (1900), 16 U. S. C. §§ 668d, 701 (1946) [Lacey Act sustained
in Rupert v. United States, 181 Fed. 87 (8th Cir. 1910)]; 32 STAT. 193 (1902),
21 U. S. C. §25 (1946) [Oleomargarine Act sustained in United States v.
Green, 137 Fed. 179 (N. D. N. Y. 1905)].
229 See In re Rahrer, supra note 128, at 561.
13o See. e.g., Kentucky Whip & Collar Co. v. Illinois Cent. R. R., supra note
128, at 350; Whitfield v. Ohio, supra note 128, at 439; In re Rahrer, supra
note 128, at 562. There is no delegation of power since it is Congress, and not
the states, which determines when the articles leave interstate commerce. See
In re Spickler, 43 Fed. 653, 658 (C. C. S. D. Iowa 1890). Congress would
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fact that the original package in which they entered was unbroken,
or that the goods had not yet commingled with the general merchandise in the state.' 3 1 The state laws purporting to regulate such
commerce, therefore, were not invalid, but merely inoperative until
congressional assent to the local policy implemented them. 3 2 For
the federal enabling law to be valid in such instances, however, the
state law must be one which the national government itself could
the exhave enacted.' 33 If it relates to a sphere of activity 3within
4
clusive control of the state, the federal law is invalid.'
This theory, however, cannot be used to justify the McGuire
Act, since that statute does not purport to modify the original package
doctrine.'33 To the extent, however, that the McGuire Act contains
a legislative declaration that resale price maintenance contracts shall
not be deemed undue burdens on interstate commerce, it resembles
the McCarran Act, 3 6 which declared that state taxation of insurance
companies was not an undue burden on interstate commerce.
also supplement state policy by prohibiting the commodity in interstate commerce. See Rupert v. United States, supra note 128. It is competent for Congress to aid state policy in such a manner. See Clark Distilling Co. v. Western
Md. Ry., supra note 128.
131 See Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419 (U. S. 1827) (where imported
goods remain in original form or package in which they were imported, state
tax prohibited until the goods are commingled with the merchandise of the
state) ; Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U. S. 100 (1890) (application of original package doctrine to interstate commerce).
132 See, e.g., In re Rahrer, supra note 128; Safe Harbor Water Power Co.
v. Federal Power Comm'n, supra note 128; In re Spickler, spra note 130;
West Virginia v. Adams Express Co., 219 Fed. 794 (4th Cir. 1915). The
decisions concerning federal enabling laws in regard to state liquor prohibition, In re Rahrer and Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Md. Ry., seem to
imply that the police power of the state is concurrent in all matters with
Congress' power to regulate interstate commerce. The act of Congress merely
removes an impediment to their operation. See Sholley, The Negative Impcations of the Comnmerce Clause, 3 U. OF CHI. L. REv. 556, 587-588 (1936).
Yet the Supreme Court
133 See In re Rahrer, 140 U. S. 545, 560 (1891).
sustained federal enabling legislation to exclude convict-made goods from their
markets. See Kentucky Whip & Collar Co. v. Illinois Cent. R. R., 299 U. S.
334 (1937) ; Whitfield v. Ohio, 297 U. S. 431 (1936). A federal statute prohibiting the interstate commerce of such goods would have been stricken since,
in Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U. S. 251 (1918), the Federal Government was
prevented from controlling the means of production by regulating interstate
commerce. Cf. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U. S. 238 (1936). The Court
was, therefore, bound by these decisions which would prevent federal prohibition of convict-made goods in interstate commerce. It was not until 1941 that
the Supreme Court expressly overruled the Hammer case and limited the
Carter case. United States v. Darby, 312 U. S. 100 (1941).
134 Cf. United States v. DeWitt, 9 Wall. 41 (U. S. 1869).
135 The original package doctrine has been rejected as regards goods in interstate commerce. See Live Poultry Dealers' Protective Ass'n v. United
States, 4 F. 2d 840, 848 (2d Cir. 1924) ; see Minnesota v. Blasius, 290 U. S. 1
(1933) (state regulation permitted where goods come to rest in state).
136 59 STAT. 33 (1945), 15 U. S. C. §§ 1011-1015 (1946).
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To justify the McCarran Act, the "balance of interest" concept
was applied.13 7 Under this theory, Congress may redefine the areas
of national and local interest, 138 since its power under the commerce
clause is plenary. 39 Congress, therefore, may not only detract from
the state's powers, 140 but also may add to them. 141 Congress, in
essence, balances the national interest against local policy, and decides which is to prevail.142
This "balance of interest" concept gives Congress the power to
determine which areas of regulation it will share concurrently with
the states, and which areas it will retain for its exclusive jurisdiction. 48 The act of Congress permitting states to place burdens on
interstate commerce is, in effect, a legislative declaration that no uniformity of regulation is required,'4 and that the area of regulation
is concurrent. By reasoning thus, the Court has solved the question
of delegation of congressional regulatory power over interstate commerce. But in validating this method of determining the issue, the
Court, it would appear, has virtually divested itself of judicial veto
over federal legislation under the commerce clause. It would seem,
therefore, that the Supreme Court would, as it has in the past, approve
this new enabling legislation.
On the basis of this "balance of interest" concept, the McGuire
Act declares that it is in the national interest to permit full effectiveness of state fair trade legislation. 1 45 While there is no technical
delegation of power, the result is the same as if Congress had in
fact delegated such regulatory power to the states. 46 However, as
Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U. S. 408 (1946).
"Congress has undoubted power to redefine the distribution of power over interstate commerce.
It may . . . permit the states to regulate the commerce in a manner which
would otherwise not be permissible... " Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona,
325 U. S.761, 769 (1945).
139 See Lottery Case,. 188 U. S. 321, 350 (1903); see McCormick & Co. v.
Brown, 286 U. S.131 (1932) ; Brooks v. United States, 267 U. S.432 (1925);
Caminetti v. United States, 242 U. S.470 (1917).
140 See United States v. Hill, 248 U. S. 420 (1919); Weber v. Freed, 239
U. S.325 (1915); CoRwIN, THE CoNsIruroN AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY
48 (10th ed. 1948).
141 See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U. S. 310, 315 (1945);
United States v. Hill, supra note 140, at 425.
142 In cases in which the Court struck down state regulation, the Court intimated that if Congress gave express approval to such regulation, it would
be permissible. See Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U. S.
384, 386, 390, 395 (1951) ; Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U. S.100, 119 (1890).
143 This concept is similar to the Cooley test. However, the Court in that
case did not declare that Congress may determine where the national interest
137

138 See California v. Zook, 336 U. S. 725, 728 (1949).

lies.

Of course, in the absence of any congressional legislation on the matter,

the Supreme Court remains the final arbiter as to whether state regulation is
permissible. See Southern Pacific Co. v.Arizona, 325 U. S.761, 769 (1945).
144 See note 137 supra.
145 See 66 STAT. 632, 15 U. S. C. A. § 45 (Supp. 1952).
:46 See CORwiN, THE CONSTITUTION AND WH1AT IT MEANS TODAY 48 (10th
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in permissible delegation to administrative bodies, the standards are
adequately set forth, and Congress retains control. Should any
amendment of state resale price maintenance prove inimical to the
national interest, Congress is always free to contract the power of
the states as may be required.
Conclusion
Many of the problems of fair trade, both legal and economic, are
still extant. The present inability to obtain a true statistical picture
of the economic effect of resale price maintenance creates an almost
insurmountable hurdle-at least for the present-to a determination
of the udsdom of such legislation.
Apart from fair trade's supposed economic desirability, and the
probability that it can successfully withstand constitutional attack,
immediate problems of law loom large. Perhaps the greatest of
these arises from the uncertain effects of the extension of the nonsigner provision into interstate commerce. In addition, it would
seem that the Sherman Act has lost one of its teeth-because its prohibition of horizontal price maintenance agreements is apparently
abolished, 147 at least where trade-marked goods are concerned.

ed. 1948);

WILLOUGHBY,

(2d 7ed. 1929).
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14 "Thenceforward, any group of distributors desiring to fix prices horizontally would be foolish to take the direct road to that end. Instead some one
of their number would make a vertical contract with a supplier and then place
the other members of the group on notice of the existence of the contract.
Through this means, the group could not only negate the objections of the
Government, but could actually use the courts as devices to enforce the
arrangement." Letter from Fed. Trade Comm'n, 9 (Feb. 2, 1952), H. R.
REP. No. 1437, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1952).

